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RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS 
BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS:  A SURVEY 
Michael  Dotsq  and  G.  King’ 
Development  of  rational  expectations  models  of 
the  business  cycle  has  been  the  central  issue  on the 
macroeconomic  research  agenda  since  the  influen- 
tial analyses  of Robert  Lucas  (1972a,  197Zb).  In this 
essay,  we  review  these  developments,  focusing  on 
the  extent  to which  the  rational  expectations  perspec- 
tive  has generated  a new  understanding  of economic 
fluctuations. 
Economists  have  long  suspected  that  expectations 
play  a central  role  in the  business  cycle,  particularly 
in determining  the  relationship  between  money  and 
economic  activity.  For  example,  Haberler’s  (1937) 
classic  interwar  survey  of  business  cycle  theory 
stresses  the  role  of  expectations,  in  a  variety  of 
theories  that  explain  the  business  cycle  as a Frischian 
(1933)  interaction  of external  shocks  and internal  pro- 
pagation  mechanisms.  Expectations  also  constitute 
an independent  source  of shocks  in “psychological” 
theories  of the  business  cycle.  However,  as Haberler’s 
survey  makes  clear,  there  has  long  been  substantial 
disagreement  among  economists  about  the  relative 
importance  of various  economic  factors-sources  of 
shocks  and  propagation  mechanisms-in  determin- 
ing the  observed  character  of business  fluctuations. 
With  the development  of formal  econometric  analyses 
of business  cycles-beginning  with Tinbergen’s  work 
(1939)  and  proceeding  through  Sargent  (1981)-it 
has  become  clear  that  unrestricted  models  of expec- 
tations  preclude  a systematic  inquiry  into  business 
fluctuations. 
The  postulate  that  expectations  are rational  in the 
sense  of Muth  (1961),  i.e.,  that  economic  agents  ac- 
cumulate  information  and  utilize  information  effi- 
ciently,  imposes  considerable  discipline  on  business 
cycle  analysis.  At present,  no  single  rational  expec- 
tations  model  has captured  all of the  central  elements 
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of the  business  cycle.  One  could  take  the  view  that 
an ultimate  explanation  of economic  fluctuations  will 
require  a  return  to  “psychological  influences.”  We 
prefer  to  believe  that  existing  individual  models 
highlight  specific  features  that  are important  and that 
the  gradual  accumulation  of knowledge  about  shocks 
and  propagation  mechanisms  will  ultimately  yield 
rational  expectations  models  consistent  with  ob- 
served  business  cycles. 
The  organization  of  our  discussion  is as follows. 
First,  we briefly  consider  a set  of “stylized  facts” that 
any successful  model  must  minimally  produce.  Then, 
we  turn  to  four  categories  of  rational  expectations 
models  of the  business  cycle,  considering  in turn  how 
each has been  developed  to account  for some  specific 
set  of  stylized  facts.  We  then  review  the  empirical 
evidence  regarding  the  overall  performance  of each 
class  of  models. 
We  begin  by  exploring  the  role  of expectations  in 
the  basic  real  business  cycle  models  of Kydland  and 
Prescott  (1982)  and  Long  and  Plosser  (1983),  in 
which  dynamics  of business  cycles  reflect  the  inter- 
action  of  temporary  real  shocks  and  intertemporal 
(capitalistic)  production.  We  then  consider  the 
monetary  business  cycle  models  of  Lucas  (1972a, 
1973)  and  Barro  (1976,  1980)  which  utilize  in- 
complete  information  as a rationale  for temporary  real 
effects  of  monetary  disturbances.  Although  agents 
have  rational  expectations  in these  models,  lack  of 
timely  information  on monetary  shocks  implies  that 
agents  erroneously  perceive  price  level  movements 
as representing  changes  in relative  prices.  After  con- 
sidering  equilibrium  models  of the  business  cycle-in 
which  prices  are  flexible-we  turn  to  Keynesian 
models  of business  fluctuation  constructed  under  the 
rational  expectations  postulate.  Our  discussion  begins 
with the  analyses  of Fischer  (1977)  and Gray  (1976), 
who  model  temporary  wage  stickiness  arising  from 
nominal  wage  contracts.  Subsequently,  we consider 
the  emerging  class  of  theories  that  focus  on  com- 
modity  price  stickiness,  beginning  with  a parable  told 
by  McCallum  (1982)  and  then  considering  some 
alternative  formal  developments  by  Rotemberg 
(1982),  Mankiw  (1985)  and  Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki 
(1987). 
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tional  macroeconomic  practice  of  considering 
business  cycles-defined  as  the  stochastic  com- 
ponents  of macroeconomic  time  series-as  stationary 
stochastic  processes.  This  practice  is foll,owed in our 
description  of  stylized  facts,  but  is also  implicit  in 
the  theoretical  economies  that  we consider,  since  the 
time  series  generated  by  these  economies  are  sta- 
tionary.  If,  in  fact,  economic  time  series  exhibit 
nonstationarity,  as  argued  by  Nelson  and  Plosser 
(1982),  then  these  classes  of models  are  called  into 
question.  In a concluding  section  we  briefly  discuss 
the  ongoing  development  of  rational  expectations 
business  cycles  that  are  capable  of producing  model 
economies  that  have  nonstationary  components. 
Stylized Facts 
Much  of our  survey  deals with the  ability  of various 
business  cycle  models  to generate  time  series  whose 
properties  are  consistent  with  commonly  discussed 
summary  statistics,  i.e.,  the  stylized  facts  of business 
cycles  (see  e.g.,  Lucas,  1977).  Presentations  of these 
stylized  facts  typically  proceed  as follows.  First,  cer- 
tain  smooth  curves  are  removed  from  the  data,  fre- 
quently  after  a  logarithmic  transformation;  these 
eliminate  deterministic  growth  and  seasonal  com- 
ponents.  Summary  statistics  are  then  calculated  on 
the  transformed  data. 
At a minimum  the  list of real  quantity  variables  to 
be  considered  consists  of the  major  national  accounts 
aggregates-consumption,  investment  and  output- 
along  with  measures  of  labor  input  (manhours, 
employment).  In  addition,  real  wages,  real  money 
balances  and  certain  financial  activity  variables  are 
frequently  considered,  as in the  growth  rate  of some 
nominal  variables  such  as the  money  stock,  nominal 
interest  rates  and  prices.  All of the  quantity  series- 
including  real  balances  -exhibit  significant  positive 
serial  correlation  at the  annual  or quarterly  interval. 
They  all also display  positive  covariation,  both  with 
output  and  with  each  other.  They  differ  somewhat 
in  relative  volatilities,  notably  investment  is  more 
volatile  than  output,  which  in turn  is more  volatile 
than  consumption.  Evidence  concerning  the  cyclical 
behavior  of the  real wage  is inconclusive;  in part,  this 
reflects  a  variety  of  constructs  used.  In  general, 
however,  there  does  not  appear  to be  a pronounced 
cyclical  relation.  Measures  of  financial  activity- 
such  as  deposit  turnover  and  bank  clearings-are 
strongly  procyclical  (Mitchell  (195 1)).  As  Lucas 
(1977)  observes,  there  is little  reason  to  qualify  the 
observations  by  reference  to  specific  time  periods. 
However,  the  relationship  between  nominal 
variables  and  the  cycle  exhibits  less  stability  over 
time.  In Mitchell’s  (195 1) consideration  of interwar 
data for the  United  States,  the  price  level  and  short- 
term  nominal  interest  rate  were  strongly  procyclical. 
More  recent  investigations  by  Hodrick  and  Prescott 
(1980)  into post-war  U.S.  cycles,  document  a chang- 
ing  relation,  price  levels  are  countercyclical  during 
the  latter  half  of  their  sample  and  short-term  rates 
are  not  systematically  related  to  economic  activity. 
However,  most  investigations  do document  a positive 
relation  between  income  velocity  and real activity  that 
mirrors  the  financial  transactions  data. 
When  many  sectors  are  included  in this  analysis, 
as  in  Mitchell  (1951),  there  is  a  tendency  for  co- 
movement  across  sectors  and  considerable  stability 
in  lead-lag  relations  relative  to  aggregate  output. 
There  do  appear  to  be  different  degrees  of  sectoral 
co-movement  and  amplitude.  For  example,  agri- 
culture  does  not  covary  closely  with  the  rest  of the 
economy.  The  producer  and consumer  durable  goods 
manufacturing  sectors  exhibit  greater  volatility  than 
the  services  sector. 
Expectations and Real Business Cycles 
In recent  years,  macroeconomists  have  begun  the 
long-postponed  task  of developing  basic  equilibrium 
models  of  economic  fluctuations.  That  this  is  an 
essential  first  step  was  cogently  argued  by  Hicks 
(1933)  over  fifty  years  ago,  who  stressed  that  one 
could  not  measure  the  extent  of  disequilibrium 
without  first  determining  the  content  of equilibrium 
theory  and that,  in a dynamic  stochastic  system,  there 
is rich  content  to  equilibrium  theory. 
The  analyses  of Kydland  and  Prescott  (1982)  and 
Long  and  Plosser  (1983)  explain  the  dynamics  of 
business  cycles  as reflecting  the  interaction  of  real 
shocks-to  total  factor  productivity-and  intertem- 
poral  (capitalistic)  production  possibilities.  The  Long 
and  Plosser  (1983)  analysis  develops  some  general 
economic  principles-mentioned  by  Haberler 
( 1937) -by  studying  the  decisions  of a representative 
consumer  (Robinson  Crusoe)  who  directly  operates 
the  production  technology  of  the  economy.  In this 
context  the  business  cycles  that  arise  are  Pareto 
efficient.  Thus,  the  mechanisms  that  generate  cyclical 
activity  are  quite  general  and  should  carry  over  to 
richer  macroeconomic  models  that  possess  incom- 
plete  information  and  nominal  rigidities,  including 
those  that  we  consider  below. 
For  example,  the  analysis  of  Long  and  Plosser 
shows  that  even  if  disturbances  to  production 
possibilities  are  temporally  independent,  real 
quantities-output,  consumption  and  capital-display 
positive  serial correlation.  Shocks  are propagated  over 
time  due  to  the  preference  of  economic  agents  for 
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technology  smoothing 
However,  persistence  shocks  limited  the 
of  factors  as  fixed 
of  For  reason,  ultimate  of 
are  That  in  periods 
a  shock,  is  net 
ment-relative  a  value-as  economy 
justs  towards  steady-state.  residual 
of  implies  it  great 
volatility  King,  and  (1988a)). 
with  independent  the 
equilibrium  predicts  of  central 
facts-positive  correlation  consump- 
and  as  as  relative 
tilities-but  to  the  serial 
relation  investment. 
there  many  Crusoe’s 
for  in  consumption 
means  the  of  temporary 
shock  one  are  transmitted  other 
Thus,  Long  Plosser  stress, 
basic  model  predicts  there 
be  with  activity 
diverse  tending  rise  fall 
Therefore,  basic  model  predicts 
of  centralized  facts 
by  (1951). 
shocks  factor  typically 
offsetting  and  effects 
the  decision,  that  optimal 
variation  employment  ambiguous.  the 
models  Long  Plosser,  two 
offset  so  there  zero 
variation  labor  Kydland  Prescott 
explore  implications  greater 
substitution  preferences,  a 
separable  recursive  specification. 
this  Crusoe  it  to  effort 
periods  which  marginal  is 
which  effort  respond  to 
productivity 
Even  temporary  to  the 
consequences  capital 
and  decisions  that  must  ex- 
about  production  In 
optimal  rules  be  when 
makes  assumptions  the 
of  and  alternative  of 
and  Furthermore,  ra- 
expectations  plays  pivotal 
in  process  transforming  social 
sions  a  theory  fluctuations, 
there  be  coincidence  Crusoe’s  a 
planner’s)  and  decentralized 
tions  private  only  expectations  rational. 
have  implications 
Crusoe’s  rules  there  serial 
lation  the  factors,  total 
productivity.  example,  incentives 
saving/investment  achieve  smooth- 
are  if  in  future 
accompany  in  produc- 
because  larger  effects  such 
Further,  future  in 
tivity  affect  marginal  to 
investment  the  to  effort, 
additional  effects  current 
Evidence on Real Business Cycles 
Although  real business  cycle  models  produce  some 
qualitative  features  of the  business  cycle  it remains 
to determine  whether  they  explain  fluctuations  pan- 
titatiwel’y.  The  initial research  effort  addressing  these 
questions  has  been  undertaken  by  Kydland  and 
Prescott  in an influential  series  of papers  (summarized 
in  Prescott  (1986)). 
Following  the  methodological  recommendations  of 
Lucas  (1980),  Kydland  and  Prescott  restrict  the 
number  of free  parameters  in their  model  economy 
by  a number  of steady-state  conditions  and  also  by 
the  extensive  use  of behavioral  parameter  estimates 
taken  from  applied  studies  in  other  fields.  For  ex- 
ample,  they  use  the  observed  constancy  of  labor’s 
share  to pin down  the  parameters  in a Cobb-Douglas 
production  function,  and  results  from  analyses  of 
financial  markets  to  restrict  a preference  curvature 
parameter  governing  the  extent  of  intertemporal 
substitution/risk  aversion.  Following  Solow  (1957), 
they  measure  variations  in total  factor  productivity 
as a residual  from  the  aggregate  production  function 
and  choose  a simply  Markovian  stochastic  process 
to  capture  the  serial  correlation  in  this  series. 
The  results  of the  Kydland-Prescott  studies  have 
been  surprising  to most  economists.  The’initial  model 
economy  produced  summary  statistics-second  mo- 
ments  of consumption,  investment,  output,  produc- 
tivity,  and  effort-that  accorded  with  the  stylized 
facts  described  previously.  (The  specific  presenta- 
tion  of  the  stylized  facts  to  which  the  Kydland- 
Prescott  model  was  compared  is  contained  in 
Hodrick  and  Prescott  (1980)).  However,  it  is also 
clear  that  the  basic neoclassical  business  cycle  model 
as developed  by Kydland  and Prescott  does  not  meet 
the  stringent  standards  of  rational  expectations 
econometrics.  Altug  (1988)  subjects  the  Kydland- 
Prescott  model  to rational  expectations  econometric 
procedures  and finds  that  the  model’s  restrictions  are 
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currently  found  in this model  this rejection  is perhaps 
not  surprising;  it  is  nevertheless  encouraging  that 
these  types  of  models  can  loosely  mimic  some  im- 
portant  aspects  of  cyclical  activity. 
The  basic  neoclassical  model  of  Kydland  and 
Prescott  has  been  criticized  on  a  number  of  other 
grounds  that  warrant  further  discussion.  First,  the 
model  has  no  implications  for  any  cyclical  variation 
in employment  or unemployment.  That  is, the  model 
uses  the  representative  agent  paradigm  and  permits 
a smooth  tradeoff  between  hours  and  output  so  all 
adjustments  in  labor  effort  take  place  in  terms  of 
hours  and  not  numbers  of workers.  Forcing  a (more 
realistic)  choice  between  working  full time  or not  at 
all would  generally  introduce  problematic  nonconvex- 
ities in production  possibilities.  However,  the  impor- 
tant  work  of Rogerson  (1988)  provides  a method  for 
analyzing  production  nonconvexities  in a represen- 
tative  agent  model.  Rogerson  uses  the  fact  that  by 
introducing  social  arrangements  that  formally  resem- 
ble  lotteries-in  that  they  specify  probabilities  of 
working  full  time  or  not  at  all-the  representative 
agent  problem  can  be  made  convex.  This  contrived 
randomness  in  the  representative  agent  and  corre- 
sponding  social  planner’s  problem  improves  welfare 
by  smoothing  the  opportunities  for effort  by  averag- 
ing across  the  population.  It corresponds  in a com- 
petitive,  multi-agent  framework  to  an  economy  in 
which  some  agents  are  employed  and  some  are  not, 
and in which  their  relative  numbers  can fluctuate  over 
time.  Further,  the  indivisibility  of work  effort  results 
in a dramatic  change  in the  corresponding  social plan- 
ner’s  problem  that  can  be  used  to  compute  com- 
petitive  outcomes.  This  optimum  problem  can  be 
interpreted  as  that  of  a  single  agent  with  a greater 
degree  of intertemporal  substitution  in labor  supply 
than  that  of  the  identical  agents  that  populate  the 
economy.  This  is empirically  important  within  the 
Kydland-Prescott  model,  since  the  greater  degree  of 
intertemporal  substitution  in aggregate  labor  supply 
is  capable  of  producing  quantitatively  greater  vari- 
ations  in  employment  (see  Hansen  (198.5)). 
The  main  potential  theoretical  alternative  for 
smoothing  production  nonconvexities  is to  allow for 
heterogeneity  of  preferences.  However,  given  the 
primitive  state  of methods  for  solution  and  estima- 
tion  of  dynamic  macroeconomic  models  this  alter- 
native  is not  practical  at the  moment.  It is, therefore, 
likely  that  Rogerson’s  insight  will  be  widely 
employed.  Overall,  the  focus  of  most  business 
cycle  models  on  hours  and  not  on  the  number  of 
employed  workers  represents  a transient  feature  and 
is  not  an  essential  character  of  the  real  business 
cycle  approach. 
The  central  criticism  of the  Prescott  model  is that 
its  internal  mechanisms  do  not  by  themselves  pro- 
duce  much  serial correlation  in economic  time  series. 
This  is because,  even  though  the  model  provides  a 
mechanism  for the  propagation  of shocks,  the  share 
of physical  capital in output  is small (about  one-third). 
Therefore,  serial  correlation  introduced  by  capital 
accumulation  in  order  to  accomplish  consumption 
smoothing  cannot  be  very  important  quantitatively 
in  this  framework  (see  King,  Plosser,  and  Rebel0 
(1988a)).  Rather,  the  cyclical  character  of the  varia- 
tion  in total  factor  productivity-the  Solow  residual 
which  is a Markov  process  that  is close  to  a ranclom 
walk-is  used  to  generate  persistence. 
The  stochastic  nature  of  the  shocks  is therefore 
a key  ingredient  for generating  the  cyclical  behavior 
in  the  Kydland-Prescott  model  and  there  has  also 
been  some  scepticism  directed  toward  the  nature  of 
these  shocks.  For  example,  one  questions  whether 
this  construct  really  captures  an exogenous  variable 
(technological  change).  If  cyclical  variations  in  the 
intensity  of utilization  of capital  and  labor  input.s are 
significant,  then  important  biases  could  arise,  since 
endogenous  decisions  with  respect  to utilization  will 
incorrectly  be  attributed  to  changes  in  technology. 
Further,  in industries  that  are noncompetitive,  there 
may  be cyclical  variations  in the  relationship  between 
marginal  cost  and  price  (mark-ups)  that  would  be 
counted  as  shocks  to  factor  productivity  by  the 
Solow-Prescott  procedure  (see  Bils,  1985).  Also, 
Barro  (1986)  and  others  have  expressed  scepticism 
that  there  are  real  shocks  of sufficient  magnitude  to 
generate  observed  cycles. 
Finally,  with  the  exception  of  King  and  Plosser 
(1984),  these  models  cannot  generate  any  of  the 
observed  correlations  between  money  and economic 
activity,  since  financial  sectors  have  been  omitted 
from  most  real  business  cycle  models. 
King  and  Plosser  (1984)  extend  the  real  business 
cycle  model  by  incorporating  accounting  services  as 
a factor  in production  of final goods.  Consequently, 
when  there  are  increases  in total  factor  productivity 
in the  final goods  sector,  there  is an induced  increase 
in  the  quantity  of  such  services  (an  intermediate 
good),  which  rationalizes  Mitchell’s  (195 1) finding 
that  measures  of transactions  activity  in the  banking 
sector  are  strongly  procyclical.  In considering  exten- 
sions to incorporate  demand  deposits  and outside  cur- 
rency,  King  and  Plosser  follow  standard  macroeco- 
nomic  practice  by assuming  that  service  flows are pro- 
portional  to  asset  stocks.  Therefore,  real  quantities 
of  currency  and  demand  deposits  covary  positively 
with  economic  activity.  Moreover,  if  price  levels 
are  not  too  countercyclical,  then  nominal  demand  * 
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in nominal  currency  may  be  unrelated  to  the  evolu- 
tion  of  the  cycle,  a hypothesis  for  which  King  and 
Plosser  provide  some  supporting  empirical  evidence. 
However,  as McCallum  (1986)  points  out,  if the  cen- 
tral  bank  is  targeting  currency  plus  deposits,  then 
these  correlations  can  also  arise  in  a  monetary 
business  cycle. 
The  main  contribution  of this  literature  is the  de- 
tailed  development  of propagation  mechanisms  which 
may  not  be  sensitive  to  the  nature  of  the  initiating 
shocks.  Therefore,  the  real  business  cycle  literature 
may  serve  as a useful  complement  to  other  equilib- 
rium  business  cycle  models,  such  as those  involving 
monetary  impulses.  It is to  this  class  of models  that 
we  now  turn. 
Money,  Expectations and Business Cycles 
The  pioneering  work  incorporating  rational  expec- 
tations  into  monetary  models  of the  business  cycle 
was  undertaken  by  Lucas  (197Za,  197213,  1973). 
Macroeconomists’  concern  with  linking  the  real  and 
monetary  sides  of the  economy  probably  stems  from 
the  influential  work  of  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
(1963),  which  appears  to  document  an  important 
causal  role  for  nominal  impulses  including  shifts  in 
the  money  supply  and  the  velocity  of  circulation. 
The  basic feature  of imperfect  information  variants 
of equilibrium  business  cycle  theory  can  be depicted 
in a simple  log-linear  business  cycle  model  that  essen- 
tially  follows  Lucas  (1973).  In  this  model,  a  non- 
storable  commodity  is produced  at distinct  locations 
indexed  by  z.  Production  in each  location  depends 
linearly  on last period’s  output  and  on the  perceived 
relative  price,  p*(z) -Etp,,  where  Etpt is the  expected 
value  of the  log of the  aggregate  price  level.  Output 
demand  at  any  location  is positively  related  to  fac- 
tors  influencing  aggregate  demand  and  a  relative 
demand  shock. 
To  close  the  model,  one  must  specify  a stochastic 
process  governing  the  supply  of money  and  the  in- 
formation  set  available  to  agents  at  each  location. 
Agents  are typically  assumed  to know  the  economy’s 
structure,  their  current  local  price,  p*(z),  and  past 
values  of all variables  and  disturbances.  They  do not 
observe  the  contemporaneous  values  of  aggregate 
data  or  of  the  disturbances. 
This  simple  framework  yields  a  number  of  key 
results  that  extend  to  other  members  of  this  class 
of equilibrium  business  cycle  models.  The  primary 
result  is that  it is only  Imperce&&monetary  disturb- 
ances  which  produce  real effects.  Perceived  changes 
in  money  affect  both  local  and  aggregate  prices 
uniformly  so  that  these  are  neutral  toward  relative 
prices  and  real  activity.  It  is  instructive  to  trace 
through  the  effects  of a positive  monetary  shock.  The 
demand  for  goods  at location  z rises,  causing  an in- 
crease  in  the  price  at  location  z.  With  incomplete 
information,  suppliers  in  location  z  do  not  know 
whether  any  particular  increase  in pt(z)  such  as that 
arising  from  the  monetary  shock  is due  to  aggregate 
or relative  disturbances.  Given  the  stochastic  struc- 
ture  of the  model,  agents  will generally  attribute  some 
of  a  money  induced  movement  in  p*(z)  to  an  im- 
provement  in relative  prices  and  therefore  they  will 
supply  more.  (The  proportion  of the  price  movement 
attributed  to  relative  shifts  in  demand  depends  on 
the  underlying  variances  of two  shocks.)  Therefore, 
an  unanticipated  increase  in  the  money  supply  will 
cause  output  to rise precisely  because  it is mistakenly 
perceived  as representing  a change  in relative  prices. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  agents  accurately  perceived 
the  shift  in the  money  supply,  they  would  neutralize 
the  effects  of this  disturbance.  Sargent  and  Wallace 
(1975)  use  this  to  develop  the  implication  that  an- 
ticipated  movements  in money  supply  have  no  real 
effects. 
An initial criticism  of Lucas’s  analysis  involved  the 
fact  that  this  simple  model  could  not  generate  the 
serial  correlation  evident  in  economic  time  series 
(Hall,  1975).  But,  as  Lucas  (197.5)  argues,  linking 
the  model  of monetary  shocks  to  capital  accumula- 
tion  and  the  other  propagation  mechanisms  of  real 
business  cycle  theory  potentially  overcomes  this 
difficulty.  For  example,  Sargent  (1979)  provides  a 
nicely  worked  out  linear  business  cycle  model  that 
utilizes  adjustment  costs  to  propagate  temporarily 
misperceived  nominal  shocks. 
The  neutrality  of perceived  monetary  disturbances 
represents  a  substantial  problem  for  this  class  of 
equilibrium  business  cycle  models.  In  reality, 
monetary  data (although  somewhat  noisy)  is produced 
in  a  very  timely  manner.  If  the  relevant  decision 
period  is approximately  one  quarter,  agents’  infor- 
mation  sets  should  plausibly  be modeled  as including 
the  available contemporaneous  monetary  data.  In this 
situation,  King  (1981)  shows  that  fluctuations  in 
output  should  be  uncorrelated  with  the  reported 
monetary  statistics,  essentially  because  expectation 
errors  about  relative  prices  should  be  uncorrelated 
with  available  information.  Further,  revisions  in the 
monetary  statistics  should  be  correlated  with  real 
activity  because  the  initial  reporting  errors  induce 
misperceptions, 
Thus,  if  monetary  disturbances  are  accurately 
perceived  then  they  cannot  be  business  cycle  im- 
pulses  in  the  manner  suggested  by  Lucas  (1972a, 
1973).  It  is important  to  stress  that  this  monetary 
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as a rational  for  the  non-neutrality  of other  nominal 
disturbances  (such  as money  demand  shocks)  that 
may  more  plausibly  be  not  directly  observable  over 
the  relevant  decision  period. 
Moreover,  King’s  (1981)  result  relies  on  the 
assumption  that  monetary  disturbances  are  ex- 
ogenous.  If the  central  bank  leans  against  changes 
in  interest  rates  or  if changes  in  inside  money  are 
correlated  with  real  activity,  then  contemporaneous 
monetary  statistics  may  be  correlated  with  output 
even  if  they  are  accurately  perceived.  King  and 
Trehan  (1984)  show  that  monetary  shocks  can  be 
non-neutral  due  to a signaling  effect,  if these  statistics 
convey  information  about  unobservable  real 
economic  conditions  that  influence  agent’s  produc- 
tion  and  investment  decisions. 
It  has  also  been  suggested  that  King’s result  may 
be  too  strong,  since  although  monetary  data  is 
available  it  may  also  be  quite  costly  to  process. 
Therefore,  agents  may  in some  sense  ignore  the  data 
in making  their  labor/leisure  decisions,  which  would 
imply  that  the  initial  specification  of the  information 
set  was  appropriate.  (Edwards  (1981)  constructs  a 
model  in which  there  is a competitively  determined 
fraction  of agent  that  acquire  costly  information  about 
the  true  monetary  state,  but  it  is  unclear  from  his 
analysis  whether  business  cycles  can be  a large  social 
problem  if  the  individual  costs  of  information  are 
small.)  The  preceding  argument  reveals  the  arbitrary 
manner  in which  information  structures  are  specified 
in this  class  of models  and  this  is a problem  that  has 
not  been  dealt  with  satisfactorily  in  the  macroeco- 
nomics  literature  to  date. 
There  are numerous  extensions  and modifications 
of  the  simple  model  just  considered.  The  most 
notable  are  those  of  Barro  (1976,  1980),  which  are 
motivated  by  intertemporal  substitution  possibilities 
rather  than  by  contemporaneous  expected  relative 
prices  (as in Lucas  (1973)  and Friedman  (1968)).  But 
these  analyses  preserve  the  central  empirical  implica- 
tions  of  the  simple  model:  (i)  the  irrelevance  of 
predictable  variations  in monetary  policy,  and  (ii) the 
causal  link  between  unperceived  monetary  disturb- 
ances  and  real  activity. 
Empirical Analyses  of Money  and 
Business Cycles 
The  empirical  work  on  monetary  impulses  in 
equilibrium  business  cycle  models  is much  too  ex- 
tensive  to cover  completely  in this  essay.  Rather,  we 
review  three  major  lines of empirical  investigation  that 
bear  on the  relevance  of this line of research.  By and 
large,  the  evidence  suggests  that  models  of this class 
do  not  adequately  represent  links  between  money 
and  business  cycles. 
Tests based  on monetary  decompositions.  The  first 
layer  of  tests  examined  the  relationship  between 
unanticipated  movements  in nominal  variables  and 
economic  activity,  with  the  key  references  being 
Sargent  (1973,  1976)  and  Barro  (1977,  1978). 
Following  Barro’s  lead,  subsequent  investigations 
have  focused  on  reduced  form  relations  between 
money  and economic  activity,  rather  than  estimation 
of systems  incorporating  a “Lucas  supply  function” 
as  in  Sargent’s  early  studies.  The  idea  behind  the 
Barro-type  tests  is  to  decompose  the  observed 
monetary  time  series  into  unanticipated  and  antici- 
pated  components  by  specifying  a prediction  rule. 
This  two-stage  procedure  involves  estimation  of  a 
money  supply  process,  with  the  residuals  treated  as 
unanticipated  money  and  the  fitted  values  treated  as 
anticipated  money.  The  empirical  studies  then  in- 
vestigate  whether  constructed  unanticipated  money 
influences  various  measures  of economic  activity  and 
if the  constructed  anticipated  components  of money 
are  neutral.  Initial  tests  by  Barro  utilized  a two-step 
procedure,  with  later  investigations  employing  the 
econometrically  more  efficient  method  of estimating 
a  simultaneous  equation  system  and  testing  cross 
equation  restrictions  (Leiderman  (1980),  and  Abel 
and  Mishkin  (1983)). 
These  tests  concern  the  joint  hypothesis  that 
expectations  are  rational,  that  the  money  supply 
process  is correctly  specified,  that  the  process  gov- 
erning  the  behavior  of the  economy  is correct,  and 
that  anticipated  money  is  neutral.  Thus,  correct 
specification  of all of these  elements  is necessary  for 
successful  execution  of these  tests.  For  example,  if 
the  Federal  Reserve’s  reaction  function  is misspeci- 
fied  through  the  exclusion  of relevant  variables  then 
measures  of  unanticipated  money  will  include  the 
effects  of these  variables.  If these  excluded  variables 
are correlated  with  explanatory  variables  in equations 
that  depict  the  behavior  of  the  relevant  economic 
magnitudes  under  consideration,  which  is likely  to 
be  the  case,  then  coefficients  will be  biased  and  test 
statistics  will  be  inappropriate. 
The  results  of  this  type  of  tests  are  mixed.  The 
analysis  of Barro  (1977)  concerning  the  relationship 
between  money  and unemployment  supports  the  im- 
plications  of  equilibrium  business  cycle  theory. 
Working  at  the  annual  interval,  Barro  provides 
evidence  that  (i) anticipated  monetary  changes  do 
not  affect  real  activity  in  a  statistically  significant 
manner,  and  (ii)  that  unanticipated  money  growth 
affects  output  over  three  years,  with  the  peak  effect 
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of the  price  level  at the  annual  interval,  Barre  (1978), 
provides  evidence  that  price  level  movements  accord 
less  well  with  the  predictions  of  theory.  Although 
anticipated  monetary  changes  have  a  one-for-one 
impact  on  the  price  level,  the  response  of the  price 
level  to monetary  shocks  is more  protracted  than  the 
response  of real activity.  Barro  and  Rush  (1980)  pro- 
vide  additional  evidence  using  data  on  unemploy- 
ment,  output,  and prices  from  the  quarterly  post-war 
time  series,  the  interval  that  has  subsequently  been 
studied  by  most  researchers.  Generally  this  study 
confirms  Barro’s  earlier  results  that  unanticipated 
money  influences  real  GNP  (positively)  and  unem- 
ployment  (negatively)  but,  as with  the  annual  data, 
the  results  involving  the  price  level  are  less  per- 
suasive.  Although  unanticipated  money  does  affect 
the  price  level  less  than  one  for  one,  the  lag struc- 
ture  for unanticipated  money  is inconsistent  with lags 
found  in  output  and  unemployment  equations. 
Working  at the  quarterly  interval,  Mishkin  (1982) 
and  Merrick  (1983)  provide  evidence  against  the 
neutrality  hypothesis,  where  the  hypothesized  money 
supply  process  and  lag lengths  are  altered  from  the 
Barro-Rush  specification.  Merrick  essentially  tries  to 
replicate  the  Barro-Rush  quarterly  results  on  real 
GNP,  after  altering  the  money  supply  process  by in- 
cluding  lagged  Treasury  bill rates  and  stock  market 
returns.  He  finds that  unanticipated  money  no longer 
affects  real  GNP,  but  that  anticipated  money  does. 
Mishkin  also alters  the  money  supply  process  by in- 
cluding  past Treasury  bill rates  but finds that  this does 
not  affect  the  Barro-Rush  results  over  a somewhat 
different  sample  period,  where  an  eight-quarter- 
maximum  lag is imposed.  However,  upon  extending 
the  lag  lengths  on  unanticipated  and  anticipated 
money  to  twenty  quarters,  he  is able  to  reject  the 
joint  hypothesis  of  rationality  and  neutrality.  The 
Merrick  and  Mishkin  results  cast  doubt  on  the 
robustness  of  the  neutrality  results  obtained  at  the 
annual  interval.  However,  in interpreting  the  above 
results,  one  must  keep  in  mind  that  a  composite 
hypothesis  is being  tested.  For  example,  if anticipated 
money  was  neutral,  but  if the  central  bank  engaged 
in  interest-rate  smoothing-as  in  Goodfriend 
(1987)  -then  variations  in money  growth  would  ac- 
company  changes  in  the  real  interest  rate.  If  the 
factors  that  lead  to these  changes  in the  real interest 
rate  are  omitted  in the  output  equation,  anticipated 
money  will  spuriously  appear  to  be  non-neutral. 
Leiderman  (1983)  investigates  the  cyclical  pattern 
of real  wage  movements  in  response  to  money  on 
both  annual  and  quarterly  data.  According  to  neo- 
classical  theory,  the  real  wage  should  decline  with 
application  of  an  increased  amount  of  effort  to  a 
f=ed  stock  of capital. Thus,  if misperceived  monetary 
shocks  fool  labor  suppliers  into  working  more,  then 
monetary  shocks  should  lower  real  wages  and  in- 
crease  output,  so that  a countercyclical  relationship 
emerges  between  monetary  shocks  and  real  wages. 
Also, predictable  shifts in money  will leave  real wages 
unaffected.  Leiderman  finds  some  support-at  both 
the  annual and quarterly  intervals-for  countercyclical 
variation  in the  real  wage,  which  is strongest  when 
the  real  wage  is deflated  by  the  wholesale  price  in- 
dex  and  when  overtime  payments  are  excluded. 
However,  in a recent  study  of a number  of manufac- 
turing industries,  Kretzmer  (1985)  finds evidence  that 
industry  specific  product  wages  (industry  wage 
divided  by the  industry  wpi component)  are uniformly 
positively  related  to unanticipated  monetary  shocks. 
Changer causality test.  Another  type  of neutrality 
test  is based  on the  following  observation:  given  the 
relevant  state  of  the  economy  (capital,  etc.),  the 
history  of  monetary  shocks  should  have  no  effects 
on  real  activity.  Sargent  (1976)  and  Sims  (1980) 
utilized  this  perspective  to construct  neutrality  tests 
along  Granger  causality  lines.  In a multivariate  con- 
text  nominal  variables  should  not  Granger-cause 
(predict)  a vector  of  real  variables  if these  contain 
the  economy’s  state  variables.  (Conditions  that  assure 
that  the  state  variable  is reputable  in  this  form  are 
provided  by  Sargent  (1979)-some  may  be  unwill- 
ing  to  impose  such  lag length  restrictions  on  error 
terms,  which  Sims  (1980)  argues  are  incredible.) 
Sargent  (1976),  Sims  (1980)  and  Eichenbaum  and 
Singleton  (1987)  illustrate  that  the  results  of  such 
tests  are  heavily  dependent  on  variable  selection 
and  data  processing,  particularly  treatment  of 
nonstationarities. 
A variant  of this  procedure  is employed  by  Haraf 
(1983),  who  examines  a  four-variable-vector  auto- 
regression  using  real  output,  employment,  inven- 
tories,  and  backorders.  A constructed  unanticipated 
money  series  does  not  Granger-cause  the  vector  pro- 
cess  governing  the  four  real  variables  in the  model, 
a result  that  is consistent  with  the  simple  equilibrium 
business  cycle  model.  However,  Haraf  also finds that 
with  the  exception  of real  GNP,  contemporaneous 
unanticipated  movements  in  money  have  little  ex- 
planatory  power  once  lagged  model  variables  are 
taken  into  account. 
Tests  based on contemporaneous monetary data.  The 
previous  tests  concentrated  on  the  distinction  be- 
tween  unanticipated  and  anticipated  changes  in 
money.  However,  equilibrium  business  cycle  theory 
typically  predicts  that  the  relevant  distinction  is 
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money.  Since  monetary  statistics  are readily  available, 
agents  misperceive  the  true  monetary  state  of  the 
economy  only  to the  extent  that  monetary  statistics 
contain  some  reporting  errors.  Therefore,  revisions 
in monetary  statistics  are  indicators  of misperceived 
money,  and  it is misperceived  money  that  should  be 
the  relevant  variable  in  explaining  real  economic 
fluctuations.  Specific  tests  of the  equilibrium  business 
cycle  theory  using  contemporaneous  monetary 
data-  historical  statistical  reports  that  werepotennid~ 
available  to private  agents-are  conducted  by  Barro 
and  Hercowitz  (1980)  and  Boschen  and  Grossman 
(1982). 
Both  of these  papers  contain  evidence  contradic- 
ting  the  implications  of  the  simple  equilibrium 
business  cycle  model  outlined  above.  Barro  and 
Hercowitz  find  that  revisions  in  the  monetary  data 
do not  help  explain  cyclical  fluctuations  of output  or 
unemployment.  Boschen  and  Grossman  focus  on 
King’s  (1981)  observation  that  output  should  be 
uncorrelated  with  available  monetary  data.  They 
begin  by constructing  a more  elaborate  procedure  that 
yields  valid  tests  of  the  real  effects  of  exogenous 
perceived  money  on  output  when  misperceived 
money  can  affect  output  through  a specific  propoga- 
tion  mechanism.  They  find  that  contemporaneous 
monetary  data  is  significantly  (partially)  correlated 
with  real  activity,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
theory.  Boschen  and  Grossman  also  test  whether 
monetary  reporting  errors  have  real consequences  and 
as in Barro-Hercowitz,  there  is no  evidence  of real 
effects.  Thus,  the  Boschen  and  Grossman  findings 
are  inconsistent  with  the  joint  hypothesis  of .(i) a 
specific  equilibrium  business  cycle  model,  (ii) that 
agents  utilize  contemporaneous  information  as 
money,  and (iii) that  measures  of money  (original and 
final  reports)  are  exogenous. 
Although  properly  specified  tests  are  difficult  to 
conduct,  the  mixed  results  of  these  three  types  of 
tests  does  not  provide  strong  support  for  the 
equilibrium  monetary  business  cycle  view.  Conse- 
quently,  investigation  of Keynesian  alternatives  seems 
warranted.  We begin  with the  notion  that  multiperiod 
contracting  imparts  some  stickiness  to  the  nominal 
wage. 
Nominal  Wage  Contracting Models 
Much  of  the  nominal  wage  contracting  literature 
is  based  on  two  lines  of  work.  One  originates  in 
Taylor  (1979,  1980)  and the  other  follows  from  Gray 
(1976)  and  Fischer  (1977). 
Taylor  (1979,  1980)  develops  a  model  with 
multiperiod,  overlapping  nominal  wage  contracts  and 
mark-up  pricing.  Simulations  of the  model  under  the 
assumption  that  wage  contracts  last for three  or four 
quarters  are used  to investigate  the  dynamics  of out- 
put  or  unemployment.  Without  any  of  the  neo- 
classical  propagation  mechanisms,  Taylor’s  models 
generate  substantial  serial correlation  from  the  interac- 
tions  of wage  setting  rules  and  expectations-shocks 
can  last  for  more  than  the  contract  length  because 
these  are  passed  along  via  other,  subsequent  con- 
tracts.  But  Taylor’s  models  have  been  criticized  as 
departing  too  far from  wage  setting  rules  that  could 
plausibly  be  rationalized  by  neoclassical  methods- 
thus  involving  wage  setting  based  on  predeter- 
mined  wage  rates  of others,  which  should  be  irrele- 
vant-and  for not  containing  the  natural  rate  property 
(for  further  discussion  of  Taylor’s  models,  see 
McCallum  (1982)). 
The  Gray  (1976)-Fischer  (1977)  perspective  on 
wage  contracts  can  be  developed  as follows.  Produc- 
tion  takes  place  at  various  locations  or  industries 
indexed  by  z,  and  depends  negatively  on  the  real 
wage  wt(z) -p*(z)  in each  location.  (All variables  are 
expressed  in  logarithms.)  In  the  one  period  ahead 
contracting  version  of the  model,  the  nominal  wage 
wt(z)  is  set  according  to  the  rule  wt(z)  =  Et-  1 
pt + r(z)(P,  -Q  _ 1PJ,  y(z)  indicates  the  extent  of in- 
dexing  in industry  z.  If y(z)  = 1, then  wages  in z are 
completely  indexed  to  the  aggregate  price  level. 
Given  the  nominal  wage,  firms  determine  employ- 
ment  along  their  marginal  product  curve,  the  effi- 
ciency  condition  being  that  the  marginal  product  of 
labor  equals  wt(z) -pt(z).  Therefore  a rise  in the  real 
wage  reduces  employment  and  output  at location  z. 
Aggregate  demand  at any location  is directly  related 
to  aggregate  real  balances  and  a  relative  demand 
shock,  as in  the  equilibrium  business  cycle  model. 
Also,  the  money  supply  is assumed  to  follow  a ran- 
dom  walk.  In this  setting,  with  incomplete  indexing 
(y(z)  <  l),  a positive  money  supply  shock  causes 
real  wages  to fall and  output  to  rise.  Also,  with  con- 
tracts  set  at  one  period  in  length,  shifts  in  money 
that  were  anticipated  at  t -  1 have  no  real  effects. 
Therefore,  tests  that  only  consider  the  distinction 
between  anticipated  and  unanticipated  money  can- 
not  distinguish  between  equilibrium  business  cycle 
models  with  no  contemporaneous  information  and 
models  with nominal  contracts  extending  for only one 
period. 
However,  as Fischer  (1977)  indicates,  when  con- 
tracts  last for  more  than  one  period,  shifts  in money 
that  are  anticipated  at  t -  1  will  have  real  effects 
since  some  locations  are  locked  into  contracts  con- 
ditioned  on  period  t -2  information.  However, 
Fischer  (1980)  reports  some  difficulties  in  imple- 
menting  this  strategy. 
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formed  by  Ahmed  (1987).  Ahmed  undertakes  a 
careful  study  of the  relationship  between  the  Phillips 
curve  slope  and  the  degree  of wage  indexation  in a 
particular  industry.  (The  data  set  includes  19  Ca- 
nadian  industries.)  The  contracting  model  predicts 
that  the  responsiveness  of  industry  specific  output 
to  unanticipated  changes  in  money  should  be  in- 
versely  related  to  the  degree  of  indexing.  That  is, 
greater  indexation  by  a particular  industry  reduces 
the  responsiveness  of  real  wages  to  unanticipated 
money  and  reduces  the  change  in  industry  output 
to a monetary  disturbance.  Ahmed  finds  no evidence 
that  there  is any relationship  between  indexation  and 
the  magnitude  of responsiveness  of industry  specific 
output  to an aggregate  monetary  shock.  These  results 
are  at  variance  with  the  implications  of  the  con- 
tracting  model. 
Therefore,  the  strategy  of  producing  monetary 
business  cycles  through  nominal  wage  rigidities  does 
not  receive  strong  empirical  support.  This  has  lead 
Keynesians  to  refocus  their  attention  on  nominal 
rigidities  that  may  occur  in other  areas  of the  econ- 
omy,  namely  in  the  price  of  specific  commodities. 
Sticky Prices and Business Cycles 
After  the  Dunlop-Keynes-Tarshis  controversy  of 
the  1930s  unveiled  the  lack  of  confirmation  for 
countercyclical  real wages,  Keynesian  macro-theorists 
turned  from  models  incorporating  stickiness  of wages 
to models  featuring  stickiness  of product  prices.  This 
activity  spanned  the  range  from  rationalizations  of 
the  pricing  equations  in  large  scale  econometric 
models  to  the  abstract  dynamic  pricing  model  of 
Phelps  and  Winter  (1970)  and  the  nonmarket  clear- 
ing  theory  of  Barro  and  Grossman  (1976).  Curi- 
ously,  this  prior  path  seems  to  have  been  ignored 
by  the  profession  at large.  Until  recently,  there  has 
been  substantial  effort  allocated  to  sticky  wage 
models  despite  their  reliance  on a countercyclical  path 
for  the  real  wage.  However,  the  past  several  years 
have  seen  increased  attention  to sticky  price  models. 
Although  this line  of research  is still at an early  stage 
and  has,  as yet,  generated  little  empirical  literature, 
we  provide  a brief  review  because  of  its  likely  im- 
portance  in  coming  years. 
Simultaneously  with  Fischer’s  wage  contract 
model,  Phelps  and Taylor  (1977)  propounded  a basic 
rational  expectations  model  with  price  stickiness,  in 
a paper  that  has  received  far less  professional  atten- 
tion  than  Fischer  (1977).  However,  research  into 
sticky  price  models  was continued  by  McCallum  in 
an  important  series  of  papers.  Initially,  McCallum 
focused  his  investigations  on  the  conditions  under 
which  sticky  price  models  rationalized  nonneutral- 
ity  of  monetary  shocks  while  maintaining  the  neu- 
trality  of  anticipated  monetary  policy  (1978,  1979, 
1980). 
More  recently,  McCallum  (1982,  1986)  has  pro- 
vided  a  detailed  outline  of  interactions  between 
nominal  shocks,  price  adjustment,  and  real  activity, 
which  presumably  will be  developed  further  in com- 
ing  years.  The  key  elements  of  this  story  are  as 
follows.  To  economize  on  certain  costs,  firms  find 
it optimal  to maintain  a set  nominal  price  over  some 
period,  accommodating  variations  in  relative  and 
aggregate  demand  through  alterations  in production 
and  inventories.  Thus,  monetary  shocks  have  real 
effects.  However,  price  adjustments  incorporate 
firms’ anticipations  about  monetary  policy,  so the  real 
consequences  of  anticipated  movements  in  money 
are much  smaller  than  unanticipated  movements  and 
may  be  fully  neutralized. 
In McCallum’s  work  the  period  over  which  sticki- 
ness  prevails  plays  a crucial  role.  If price  stickiness 
is to  be  assigned  a major  role  in  business  cycles- 
even  as an impulse  mechanism-then  the  period  over 
which  firms elect  to make  prices  sticky  must  be non- 
trivial.  McCallum  (1982,  1986)  begins  by reviewing 
theoretical  explanations  of  why  producers  might 
temporarily  stabilize  relative  prices  against  shocks, 
for  example  to  attract  a clientele  of customers  who 
prefer  relative  price  stability.  He  then  argues  that  the 
costs  within  period  adjustment  of nominal  prices- 
or  of  indexation  that  would  neutralize  monetary 
shocks-cannot  be  the  physical  costs  of  adjusting 
prices,  but  rather  are computational  costs  associated 
with  the  difficulties  that  agents  face  in understanding 
more  complex  contracts.  He  also  argues  that  index- 
ation  provides  only  small  reductions  in risks  to par- 
ticipants,  although  it  is  unclear  how  this  is  consis- 
tent  with  business  cycles  that  are an important  social 
problem. 
Some  other  recent  attempts  to give theoretical  con- 
tent  to  the  idea  of  price  stickiness  have  proceeded 
along  two  different  paths.  One  avenue  emphasized 
by  Mankiw  (1985)  and  Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki 
(1987)  involves  models  with  monopolistically  com- 
petitive  firms that  face fixed  (menu)  costs  of adjusting 
prices.  So far,  this  line  of research  has  concentrated 
on  establishing  that  menu  costs  that  are  small  can 
lead to large  departures  from  socially  efficient  alloca- 
tions  when  nominal  shocks  occur.  These  models  are 
not yet  dynamic,  so that  distinctions  between  antici- 
pated  and  unanticipated  movements  in  nominal 
variables  have  not  yet  been  explored.  But  it stands 
to  reason  that  there  would  be  results  that  differed 
from  McCallum’s,  since  in his setup  there  are  effec- 
tively  zero  costs  of adjusting  prices  between  periods 
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First,  as in Mankiw  (1983,  large  nominal  shocks- 
even  if  unanticipated-would  tend  to  be  neutral- 
ized.  Second,  small  anticipated  changes  in  money 
would  tend  not  to be  neutralized,  as the  menu  costs 
would  be  prohibitive.  Irrespective  of one’s  view  on 
the  plausibility  of menu  costs,  these  recent  analyses 
provide  a  clue  as  to  how  individual  agents  might 
regard  the  gains to altering  nominal  contracts  assmall 
even  though  the  social  benefits  would  be  large,  due 
to the  suboptimality  of monopolistically  competitive 
equilibria. 
Another  line  of  research  has  been  pursued  by 
Rotemberg  (19&Z), who  employs  quadratic  costs  of 
price  adjustment  to  induce  gradual  price  adjustment. 
As  in  Phelps-Winter,  these  costs  are  viewed  as 
arising  from  an  erosion  of the  firm’s  clientele,  with 
a  specific  interpretation  involving  an  individual’s 
dislike  of price  volatility.  Using  rational  expectations 
methodology,  Rotemberg  provides  evidence  that 
prices  adjust  gradually,  although  the  specific  struc- 
tural  models  which  he  employs  are inconsistent  with 
the  cross-equation  constraints  implied  by the  rational 
expectations  postulate. 
As the  dynamic  implications  of sticky-price  macro- 
models  are developed  in more  detail,  it will become 
possible  to  discriminate  between  these  models  and 
the  flexible  price  equilibrium  theories  considered 
earlier.  In this  process,  since  price  level  behavior  is 
a result  of the  interaction  between  private  agents  and 
the  monetary  authority,  an  adequate  definition  of 
price  stickiness  will  be  required.  In particular  most 
researchers  have  focused  on  the  smoothing  of price 
level  variations  that  arises from  private  sector  actions. 
However,  smoothing  can  also  arise  from  systematic 
actions  by  the  monetary  authority  (see  Goodfriend, 
1987).  Powerful  tests  will  presumably  require 
systematic  examination  of data generated  prior  to the 
creation  of  the  Federal  Reserve. 
The  microeconomic  evidence  developed  by  Carl- 
ton  (1986)-working  with the  StiglerXindahl(l970) 
data-shows  that  some  prices  are  fairly  rigid. 
However,  the  rigidities  do  not  seem  to  conform  to 
those  that  have  been  postulated  by macro-modelers. 
For  instance,  many  price  changes  are  extremely 
small,  indicating  that  menu  costs  are not  a pervasive 
factor.  Carlton  also does  not  find much  evidence  that 
buyers  have  strong  preferences  for  products  whose 
prices  are  relatively  stable,  implying  that  one  ra- 
tionalization  of  Rotemberg’s  costs  of  adjustment  is 
apparently  inoperative.  As the  particular  mechanism 
that  generates  rigidities  could  be quite  important  for 
the  dynamic  implications  of  this  class  of  models, 
identification  of  the  empirically  relevant  sources  of 
rigidities  is  necessary.  At  this  stage,  this  class  of 
models  should  be  regarded  as  a  potentially  prom- 
ising  means  of resurrecting  longstanding  Keynesian 
notions.  As of yet  their  value  has  not  been  proven. 
Conclusion 
In our  overview  of rational  expectations  models  of 
business  fluctuations,  we  have  consciously  empha- 
sized  the  extent  to  which  this  class  of  models  has 
generated  cyclical  interactions  that  are consistent  with 
empirical  evidence.  Evidently,  progress  has not  been 
rapid  and  there  is currently  no  compelling  evidence 
for  any  particular  description  of  cycles,  despite  the 
fact  that  the  models  quite  frequently  have  substan- 
tially  distinct  policy  implications.  We  do  not  regard 
this  assessment  as  a reason  for  departing  from  the 
discipline  imposed  by  rational  expectations,  but  feel 
that  this is rather  an indication  of the  amount  of work 
that  remains  to  be  done. 
In fact,  some  recent  research  has led us to become 
less  sure  that  the  conventional  representation  of 
business  cycles-  the  stochastic  components  of eco- 
nomic  time  series-is  appropriate.  Nelson  and Plosser 
(1982)  have  produced  some  provocative  empirical 
work  which  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the 
stochastic  components  of economic  time  series  are 
nonstationary,  possessing  random  walk components. 
Although  their  tests  have  low  power  against  the 
alternative  that  the  stochastic  components  are  sta- 
tionary  but  highly persistent  (McCallum,  1986),  these 
results  represent  a serious  challenge  to existing  views. 
Further,  there  are  now  basic  equilibrium  models  of 
fluctuations  that  imply  nonstationarity  if the  inter- 
temporal  technologies  are restricted  so that  the  rnean 
rate  of  economic  growth  is  endogeneously  deter- 
mined  (King  and  Rebel0  (1986)),  basically  because 
fixed  factors  are  not  too  important.  Further,  these 
endogenous  growth  models  have  substantial  impli- 
cations  for  modelbuilding  under  the  rational  expec- 
tations  postulate,  for  they  imply  that  there  are 
transformations  of nonstationary  economic  variables 
that  are stationary-  that  is, the  macroeconomic  data 
possess  a cointegrated  representation  (King,  Plosser, 
Stock  and  Watson  (1986)). 
Our  forecast  is  that  the  construction  of  rational 
expectations  model  of the  business  cycle  will be  the 
centrepiece  of the  macroeconomic  research  agenda 
over  the  next  fifteen  years,  as much  as it  has  been 
over  the  fifteen  that  have  passed  since  Lucas’s  in- 
fluential  contributions  (1972a,  1972b).  Recently, 
Lucas  (1987)  has  argued  that  economic  fluctuations 
pale  in welfare  significance  relative  to the  factors  that 
determine  the  growth  path  of  a particular  country’s 
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of  these  factors  (1988).  Most  macroeconomists 
presumably  share  McCallum’s  (1986)  scepticism  that 
economic  fluctuations  are  second  order  problems 
relative  to economic  growth  and,  hence,  would  doubt 
that  Lucas’s  current  research  direction  will have  the 
impact  of  his  1972  work.  But  we  are  not  so  sure, 
for  if the  analysis  of King  and  Rebel0  (1986)  is sus- 
tained  in  richer  models,  then  it  is inappropriate  to 
separate  the  study  of economic  fluctuations  from  that 
of economic  growth.  That  is, the  fact that  economies 
grow  tells us that  temporary  shocks  to the  economy’s 
production  possibilities  will have  permanent  effects 
on  the  level  of  output. 
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